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S I ATEMEN I OF J URISDIC 1 ION 
f ! i - r'c-x\r - - * i ii;i jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78A-3-102(3)G), 78A-4-103(2)0') (2008). 
ISSUES AND s i A A I J A K O u t K E A »E v% 
Did the tria 1 : -oi lit abi lse its discretion when it granted I}efendant/Counterclaimant 
Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ("Mobiinihf"! motion for -.auctions and entered default judgment 
against Plaintiff/Counterclaim-defendant:;iu> \igiiL ; ;.-. A\d Counterclaim-defendants 
Is K I\ lachinery P T\ I td ("K K Machinery ") and Pai ll I a Mai r (collects el> 
"DayNight") on the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, [Tenth, and Thirteenth 
Claims for Relief in Mobilighfs First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, granting a pei manent inji mc tion against Day] light, and ordei iiig Day Night to 
pay Mobilighfs costs and attorney fees. Specifically, DayNight asserts the following 
issues on appeal: 
I. The district court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions loi 
s|>ohiitiuii i>I I' iidi in v IIIIM-II 1111 in- is iin i \nU nee that DayNight destroyed Mr. 
Rowe's laptop willfully or in bad faith and when there is no evidence tha t DayNight 
engaged in a pa t t e rn of egregious beha\ ior by disregarding cour; ->: «ers. 
Preservation! ' I his issi le w as pi esei \ ed ii i tlie i ecoi d ii i DayN igl it's 1\ len lorai ldum 
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight Inez s Motion fojr Terminating Sanctions (R. 
561 -71) and in the Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (iL 874; 16-26). 
Standard of Review: • ,i . ' ' ! ' . i i i r ! ' ' ;*". - i V ' - -I 
discretion in selecting and imposing sanctions for discovery violations. . . . Appellate 
1 
courts may not interfere with such discretion unless abuse of discretion in selecting which 
sanction to impose may be shown 'only if there is either an erroneous conclusion of law 
or no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.'" Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999 UT App 127, 
If 15, 981 P.2d 407 (quoting Morton v. Continental Baking Co.. 938 P.2d 271, 274 (Utah 
1997)); see also Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Dev., 2006 UT App 48,^[9, 
129P.3d287. 
II. The district court abused its discretion by imposing the "extreme 
sanction" of default judgment on DayNight 
Preservation: This issue was preserved in the record in DayNight5 s Memorandum 
in Opposition to Defendant Mobilight Inc/s Motion for Terminating Sanctions (R. 561-
71) and in the Hearing on Motion for Sanctions (R. 874:16-26). 
Standard of Review: The Utah Supreme Court has stated that 
the extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered by the careful 
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited. . .. The 
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the 
judicial process, viz, where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the 
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer 
have any factual merit. 
W.W. & W.B. Gardner Inc. v. Park West Village. Inc.. 568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977). 
Moreover, in Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 1995 Utah LEXIS 20 (Utah ] 995), 
the court similarly held that a district court must exercise restraint when imposing the 
sanction of default judgment: t;[w]hen the sanction imposed is that of a default judgment, 
the most severe of sanctions, the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow than 
when the court is imposing less severe sanctions.'' Id. 
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III. 1 he district court abused its discretion in determining the amoun-
attoi iiej, fees and costs to award Mobilight without apportioning the fees and costs 
expended. 
Preservation: 'iius issue was preserved in the record in Dax- -^iini - :viciiirr;::..: i 
it i Opposition to Mobilight Ii ic.'s I\ lotion fori :;"ii lal Entry of Default Judgment (R. 
726-31). 
Standard of Review: The district coun hu> "*bi<Kiu discretion n\ viL.crn.iiLi;^ *\hat 
discretion standard." Jensen v. Sawyers, 2005 UT 81, ^127, 130 i\3d 325 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
S I A I EMEN' I OF I 'HE CASE 
Mobilight is in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling portable light 
towers and other equipment. In July 2005, Mr. William Cory Rowe began working for 
Mobilight Iti December JWU-;.. :.a. i^)\\ ^ became 1\ lobilighf $ operations manau.T .i:*-. 
held that position i mtil he ei ided his employ ii lent with IV! :)bi.light 311 A : S. 2l)n&. 
Upon ending his employment with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe began working w ith M • Paul 
LaMarr and DayNight, \ .M on a new business ventuie r(I w met; M\ .VLIM w v\..,= design, 
manufact I ire, and sell diffei ent, n lore expensive, portable light tow ers 
While employed with Mobilight, Mi. Rowe used a pergonal Sony portable laptop 
computer in the performance of his job duties. During his exit interview . Mr Rowe 
d.'^ c.i.sM.i .•.-•.:•; I- *" * • - loin's pre - > • i - !<•*•• -'vr 
Mr. Johnson gave Mr. Rowe pennission to leave without erasing or returning any 
information because the information on the laptop was old and outdated. Still, after Mr. 
Rowe began working for DayNight, Mobilight began harassing Mr. Rowe to return the 
hard drive. Mr. Rowe refused to return the laptop to Mobilight because the laptop also 
contained DayNight's confidential information. In an attempt to avoid any other 
problems regarding the laptop, and to illustrate to Mobilight that DayNight was not using 
any of Mobilight's proprietary information, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr destroyed the 
laptop. 
Mobilight moved for discovery sanctions because, according to Mobilight, the 
evidence on Mr. Rowe's hard drive was essential to proving its case against DayNight. 
The district court awarded sanctions to Mobilight by granting default judgment on the 
First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and Thirteenth Claims for Relief in 
Mobilight's First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint, and awarding 
attorney fees and costs to Mobilight. The district court entered its final judgment 
pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on November 16, 2009. 
DayNight now appeals the district court's final judgment awarding sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS3 
A, Mobilight9s background and business information. 
1. Mobilight is a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in West 
Jordan, Utah. (R. 330). 
1
 In an effort to marshal the evidence, DayNight recites many of the facts included in the 
district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Mobilight's motion for 
preliminary injunction. Naturally, DayNight does not necessarily agree with the courf s 
findings. 
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2. Ross Johnson is the president and CEO of Mobilight. Mr. Johnson started 
Mobilightinl994. (R. 881:57). 
3. Mobilight is in the business of designing, manufacturing and selling portable light 
towers, as well as other power equipment. Mobilight sells these light towers to dealers 
and end users worldwide, including Australia, North America and South America. (R. 
331; 584; 881:57-59). 
4. Mobilight holds certain confidential proprietary informlation, including trade 
secrets, regarding the design, manufacture and sale of its products. (R. 584; 881:94-101). 
5. Mobilight also considers its business and customer information to be confidential 
information. (R. 584; 881:99-100). 
6. Mobilight has taken efforts to maintain the confidentiality of its information, 
including, but not limited to, the application of confidentiality agreements with 
employees and suppliers, use of password protected computet data files, and the limit of 
its employees' access to confidential information on a uneed to know" basis. (R. 584; 
881:101-105). 
7. Still, much of Mobilight's confidential information is in the public domain, 
including certain manufacturing and component specifications listed on Mobilighf s web 
site. (R. 881:48-52, 106-07). 
8. Mobilight"1 s geographic market includes Australia, North America, and South 
America. (R. 331; 584). 
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B. Mr. Rowe's employment with Mobilight. 
9. Mr. Rowe began working for Mobilight in July 2005. Prior to employment with 
Mobilight, Mr. Rowe was a retail sales clerk for the R.C. Willey furniture company. He 
had no previous experience working with portable light towers. (R. 883:48). 
10. Mr. Rowe had some college at Salt Lake Community College prior to his 
employment with Mobilight, where he took electronics classes, math classes, computer 
classes, and physics classes. In fact, he was attending the community college on a 
robotics scholarship for winning a robotics competition. (R. 883:43-46). 
11. Mr. Rowe also had a hobby of building and rebuilding cars. (R. 883:46-48). 
12. Initially, Mr. Rowe was hired at Mobilight to work on government contracts for 
Mobilight. He then began sales and eventually became Mobilight's operations manager. 
R. 881:110-12; 883:48, 51-53). 
13. Mr. Rowe's job duties as operations manager included managing the daily 
activities of the manufacturing/production teams, directing the shop quality control 
programs, developing improvements in both product quality and processes, planning 
production schedules and deliverables, overseeing production budgets and reporting 
financial matters to Mobilight's chief financial officer and chief operating officer. (R. 
584; 881:13; Defendant's Ex. 1). 
14. In performing these responsibilities, Mr. Rowe gained access to Mobilight's 
confidential information. (R.584; 881:113-14). 
15. Upon beginning work with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe was required to sign a Property 
Protection Agreement (UPPA"), dated July 15, 2005. (R. 584-85; 883:49). 
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16. In the PPA, Mr. Rowe acknowledged that Mobilight holds confidential 
information and agreed that he would never use or disclose any of Mobilight's 
confidential information. The PPA also prohibited Mr. Rowe from making or 
manufacturing any work derivative from or in any way similaif to Mobilight5s creative 
works, either during his employment or after temiination of his employment. (R. 584-85; 
883:49-50). 
C. Business dealings between Mobilight and KK Machinery. 
17. In 2007, Mobilight entered into discussions with KK Machinery regarding the 
possibility of KK Machinery distributing Mobilight's light toyers to different rental 
companies and end-users in Western Australia. (R. 881:128-^2; 882:179-83). 
18. As a result of these discussions, Mr. LaMarr, personally and on behalf of KK 
Machinery, signed a PPA dated June 20, 2007. According to |the PPA, Mr. LaMarr 
promised never to use or disclose any of Mobilight's confidential information, nor to 
make or manufacture any works derivative from or in any way similar to Mobilight's 
creative works. (R. 586 R. 881:132-35). 
19. Tliroughout these discussions, Mobilight represented tp KK Machinery that their 
light towers were compliant with Australia's safety regulations. (R. 882:81-82). 
20. On August 14, 2007, KK Machinery and Mobilight entered into a Distribution 
Agreement in which KK Machinery was granted distributors^ rights for Mobilight 
products in Western Australia. (R. 586-87). 
21. In paragraph 5(e) of the Distributorship Agreement between Mobilight and KK 
Machinery, KK Machinery promised that as the distributor, i\ would not disclose, at any 
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time, any confidential business information that it obtained from Mobilight, which 
information was not specifically intended for public use of distribution by KK 
Machinery. (R. 587). 
22. Throughout the course of the Distributorship Agreement, KK Machinery and Mr. 
LaMarr had access to and learned Mobilight's confidential information. Mr. Johnson 
gave Mr. LaMarr special training for a total of approximately four or five days regarding 
Mobilight's light tower business and explained to Mr. LaMarr the process of 
manufacturing Mobilight's light towers. (R. 587; 881:136-158). 
23. However, after KK Machinery received its first shipment of light towers from 
Mobilight, it was unsatisfied with the quality of Mobilight's light towers and shortly 
thereafter discovered that the light towers were not compliant with Australia's safety 
regulations, as represented by Mobilight. (R. 882:195-202, 207). 
24. Mr. La Marr contacted Mobilight to express its concern with the light towers, but 
did not receive much cooperation from Mobilight. (R. 882:203). 
25. Mr. LaMarr did express satisfaction with Mr. Rowe's responsiveness to KK 
Machinery's needs. (R. 882:203). 
26. KK Machinery expended a significant amount of money and time trying to make 
Mobilight's light towers meet the Australian compliance requirements. (R. 882:213-14). 
27. On April 9, 2008, Mr. Karl Prall and Mr. LaMarr of KK Machinery personally 
came to Mobilight's facilities in West Jordan, Utah. (R. 881:161; 882:214). 
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28. Mr. LaMarr testified that he and Mr. Prall came to Utah to discuss Mobilighf s 
lack of help in making Mobilight's light towers compliant with Australian safety 
regulations. (R. 882:214). 
29. However, Mr. Johnson testified that prior to their arrival in Utah, Mr. Prall and 
Mr. LaMarr requested a meeting with Mobilight, but they did uot explain their desire for 
a meeting with Mobilight or the purpose for their visit. (R. 88 \: 161). 
30. Before their meeting began, Mr. Prall and Mr. LaMarr received a tour of 
Mobilight's facilities. (R. 881:162). 
31. During the meeting on April 9, 2008, KK Machinery stated that Mobilight needed 
to pay for KK Machinery's expenses in making the Mobilight light towers Australian 
compliant. (R. 882:214). 
32. Mobilight responded that it was under no obligation to pay those expenses under 
the Distributor Agreement and the parties began fighting. (R.|881:162-64; 882:216-17). 
33. Mr. Prall and Mr. LaMarr then cancelled an order for Mobilight light towers and 
later the parties terminated the Distributor Agreement. The parties both signed a pre-
prepared document for the parties to sign effectuating the termination. (R. 881:162-64; 
882:216-17). 
D. Mr. Rowe's termination of employment with Mobilight. 
34. Mr. Rowe voluntarily ended his employment with Mobilight on April 18, 2008. 
(R. 585; 881:26-28). 
35. In January 2008, thi'ee months prior to Mr. Rowe terminating his employment with 
Mobilight, Mr. Rowe had a conversation with Margaret Johnkom Mobilighf s vice-
9 
president. During this conversation, Ms. Jolinson was stunned when Mr. Rowe indicated 
he was unhappy with his employment and suggested that he and Ms. Johnson could open 
their own mobile light tower business. (R.585; 881:30-32). 
36. However, although Ms. Johnson is married to Mr. Johnson, the president and CEO 
of Mobilight, she didn't mention this conversation with Mr. Rowe to her husband until a 
few months after the conversation took place. (R. 881:33-36). 
37. When Mr. Rowe finally did end his employment with Mobilight in April 2008, he 
had an exit interview with Mr. Johnson, during which Mr. Rowe told Mr. Johnson that he 
was leaving Mobilight to pursue his studies. (R. 881:167; 883:56-58). 
38. Also during this exit interview, Mr. Johnson and Mr. Rowe discussed Mr. Rowe's 
personal laptop computer. Mr. Johnson allowed Mr. Rowe to keep his personal laptop 
without inspecting it or deleting any files from it because the laptop belonged to Mr. 
Rowe and contained outdated information. (R. 883:67-68). 
39. After leaving Mobilight, Mr. Rowe received multiple phone calls from Mr. 
Michael Gulbraa, Mobilight's chief operating officer, asking Mr. Rowe if he was 
planning on working for DayNight, LLC. (R. 881:276-78). 
40. Mr. Rowe gave evasive and ambiguous responses to Mobilight as to why he was 
leaving employment with Mobilight. (R. 585; 881:276-78). 
41. Finally, Mr. Rowe told Mr. Gulbraa that he was, in fact, working for KK 
Machinery. (R. 881:279-80). 
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E. Formation of DayNight, LLC. 
42. The business name of DayNight, LLC was registered with the Utah Department of 
Commerce on March 19, 2008. (R. 587). 
43. The business of DayNight, LLC was registered with the Utah Department of 
Commerce on June 12, 2008. (R. 587). 
44. KK Machinery was in a joint venture with DayNight, LLC for the design 
manufacture, and sale of DayNight's portable light tower. (R.| 587). 
45. KK Machinery and DayNight are direct competitors to Mobilight in the light 
tower market. (R. 587). 
46. KK Machinery, DayNight, LLC, and Mr. LaMarr are new to the portable light 
tower industry; they had no experience in the industry prior tc\ KK Machinery entering 
into the Distribution Agreement with Mobilight. (R. 587; 883:7-10). 
47. Mr. LaMarr was a member and general manager of DayNight, LLC. (R. 330). 
48. After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began to work officially 
for KK Machinery and DayNight in a position similar to his position at Mobilight. (R. 
588). 
49. In March 2008, while Mr. Rowe was still employed by Mobilight, Mr. Rowe 
began communicating with Mr. LaMarr via email about locating commercial space for 
DayNight's new competing business and locating and pricing component parts for 
DayNight's competing portable light towers. (R. 883:14-17)) 
50. Mr. Rowe testified that some of the documents he creited while working at 
Mobilight were for the new light tower product at DayNight. Mr. Rowe further testified 
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that he kept his work for DayNight a secret, primarily because he believed that his 
potential for growth at Mobilight was limited and that he did not have a future with 
Mobilight. (R. 883:54-58, 118-20). 
51. However, even though he did actually perform some job functions while still 
employed at Mobilight, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr also testified that they both took steps 
to keep Mobilight information confidential and separate. (R. 883:70-75). 
E. Differences between the Mobilight light tower and the DayNight light tower. 
52. Mobilight asserts that the identities of its suppliers are part of Mobilight's 
confidential information. The district court found that using this information, DayNight 
has contacted certain Mobilight suppliers about components for the DayNight light tower. 
(R. 589). 
53. However, Mr. Rowe testified that he came across these suppliers because these 
suppliers maintain public businesses and are accessible through various public media. 
(R. 883:78-84). 
54. DayNight used over thirty suppliers in building its light tower. Only three of the 
suppliers it used were also Mobilight suppliers: MetalFab, Henderson Wheel, and 
Anixter International. (R. 882:222-23). 
55. Employees of all three of these suppliers testified that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr 
specifically asked them not to discuss anything that Mobilight has ordered, manufactured, 
or used in building Mobilighf s light tower. (R. 882:116-118; 126-128; 136-38). 
56. All of the components used for its light tower are '"off the shelf components while 
many of Mobilight's components are custom made. (R. 883:84). 
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57. DayNight's light tower has similar components to Mobilight's light tower 
including a diamond plated front panel and a laser-cut rear panel, a hydraulically-
operated light mast, the same make and model gasoline motor, a bank of parabolic 
reflector lights, push-pull cables similar to those used in Mobilight's towers, and an axle 
assembly and electrical cables. (R. 591) 
58. However, many of the similarities between the Mobilight light tower and the 
DayNight light tower could also be seen between any of the li^ht towers on the market. 
Many of the design specifications and the component parts of the Mobilight light tower 
are in the public domain, including being listed on Mobilight'$ own website. Any 
purchaser of a Mobilight light tower would know the general components and designs of 
the Mobilight light tower that are similar to the DayNight light tower, as well as to other 
light towers on the market. (R.881:48-51). 
59. There are also significant differences between the Mobilight light tower and the 
DayNight light tower. In fact, DayNight's expert witness at the hearing for preliminary 
injunction testified that the two light towers are "radically different." These differences 
include the hydraulic ram designs, light mast designs, chassis structure, light systems 
designs, and stabilizer legs. (R. 591-92; 883:151-52). 
F. Mr. Rowe's personal laptop computer. 
60. While employed at Mobilight, Mr. Rowe used a personal, portable laptop 
computer in the performance of his job duties. His laptop contained certain confidential 
infonnation, data and files downloaded from Mobilighf s computer network. This 
downloaded infonnation included data regarding Mobilight*$ product designs, 
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manufacturing, processes, customers, sales methods, business operations, specifications, 
fmancials, supply costs and pricing. (R. 586; R. 883:65-66). 
61. On June 2, 2008, Mr. Gulbraa asked Mr. Rowe for the laptop he used while 
employed at Mobilight or the hard drive from that laptop. Mr. Gulbraa also asked Mr. 
Rowe to return Mr. Rowe's cell phone that he used during his employment at Mobilight. 
(R. 588; 881:283-84). 
62. Mr. Rowe said that he would have to check with Mr. Karl Prall of KK Machinery 
and Mr. LaMarr before he gave either of these things to Mobilight. (R. 588; R 881:284). 
63. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Gulbraa of Mobilight offered to give Mr. Rowe a new hard 
drive for his computer so that he could keep his computer. (R. 588; 881:283). 
64. Mr. Rowe did not give the hard drive to Mobilight because his computer also 
contained information concerning DayNight. (R. 588; 883:94). 
65. Throughout June and July 2008, Mobilight continued to harass Mr. Rowe and Mr. 
LaMarr about giving the laptop computer or the laptop computer's hard drive to 
Mobilight (R. 881:283-84; 883:93-94). 
66. On July 25, 2008, Daynight filed a lawsuit against Mobilight for trespass. (R. 1-6) 
67. On July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr destroyed the laptop that Mr. Rowe 
had used while working at Mobilight by throwing the laptop off a building and driving 
over it with a truck. (R. 588; 882:99). 
68. Mr. Rowe also refused to give his cell phone and his cell number (801) 755-9395 
to Mobilight, even though Mobilight had paid for that cell number while Mr. Rowe was 
employed at Mobilight. (R. 589; 883:68-69). 
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69. On June 2, 2008, Mr. Rowe told Mr. Gulbraa that KK Machinery was now paying 
for Mr. Rowers cell phone. (R. 589; 881:284). 
70. Mr. Rowe testified that he had the cell number prior to beginning work at 
Mobilight and he did not want to get a new cell phone number since he had been using 
that for all of his personal needs as well. (R. 883:68). 
71. On September 5, 2008, the district court ordered Mr. Rowe to return the sim card 
on the cell phone to Mobilight. Mr. Rowe returned the cell phone sim card, but the sim 
card was clear. (R.589). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING 
TERMINATING SANCTIONS AGAINST DAYNIGHT WHEN DAYNIGHT 
DID NOT ACT WILLFULLY OR IN BAD FAITH AND DID NOT 
CONSISTENTLY DISREGARD COURT ORDERfS. 
The district court abused its discretion in sanctioning DayNight, thereby awarding 
Mobilight default judgment on its First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and 
Thirteenth Claims for Relief, granting Mobilight a permanent injunction against 
DayNight, and ordering DayNight to pay Mobilight's attorney fees and costs. Rule 37(g) 
of the Civil Rules of Utah Procedure provides that a court may impose sanctions under 
rule 37(b)(2) "if a party destroys, conceals, alters, tampers with or fails to preserve a 
document, tangible item, electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty." Utah 
R. Civ. Pro. 37(g) (emphasis added).2 "Rule 37(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure [then] authorizes the district court to sanction a party who 'fails to obey an 
~ DayNight notes that there is no Utah case law interpreting i~ule 37(g) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
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order' of the court during discovery." Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement Inc., 2008 UT 
82, j^22, 199 P.3d 957 (emphasis added). 
In reviewing a district court's imposition of sanctions, the appellate court follows 
a two-step process. First, the appellate court reviews the district court's factual findings 
to ensure that the district court found the offending party's behavior to merit sanctions. 
See id. at ^23. And second, once the district court has made the finding that the 
offending party's behavior merits sanctions, the appellate court "will only disturb the 
sanction if 'abuse of discretion [is] clearly shown.'" Id, (alteration in original). 
A. The district court abused its discretion when it imposed sanctions 
against DayNight and awarded default judgment to Mobilight 
because its decision lacked an evidentiary basis, 
A district court can only impose sanctions under rule 37(b)(2) if the district court 
finds "willfulness, bad faith, fault or persistent dilatory tactics frustrating the judicial 
process." Tuck v. Godfrey, 1999UTApp 127416,981 P.2d407. Regarding the rule's 
willful or bad faith requirement, the court has stated that "[t]he willfulness requirement 
cannot be satisfied by showing mere prejudice. Rather, there must be evidence that the 
noncompliance was the product of willful failure." Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82, [^24. 
Regarding the rule's fault requirements, the court likewise explained that the fault 
requirement can only be satisfied when fault is accompanied by additional willful 
behavior. See id. ^ 30-31. 
The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that willful behavior is typically found 
when the offending party has engaged in a consistent pattern of disregarding court orders 
or discovery requirements. Utah case law clearly illustrates this point. 
16 
In Kilpatrick v.Bullough Abatement, Inc., the Utah Supreme Court reviewed a 
district court's order sanctioning the plaintiffs for failing to obtain an autopsy following 
their husbands' deaths and dismissing the plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. 2008 UT 82, 
^21. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in 
dismissing the plaintiffs' claims because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs' 
behavior was willful. See id. ^24. The court's refusal to find willfulness was based in 
part on the fact that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a consistent pattern of behavior 
disregarding court orders or discovery requirements, holding that "[i]n cases meriting 
sanctions, there is often a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery 
requirements or court orders, as well as evidence that the sanctioned party is on notice 
that its pattern of behavior will result in sanctions if it continues." Id. ^35 (emphasis 
added). The court then noted several Utah cases illustrating this point. Id.; see Utah 
Dept. of Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 1995 Utah LEXI$ 20 (upholding the district 
court's sanctioning where the offending party had received "riumerous notices, motions, 
and orders" for discovery from the court and the opposing party and was on notice that 
this pattern would result in sanctions); Arnica Mut. Ins. v. Scfrettler, 768 P.2d 950, 954-
55, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "a pattern of aggravated misconduct in the 
fomi of willful and deliberate disobedience of discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and 
witness tampering" justified sanctions); First Fed. Sav. & Lo^n Ass'n. v. Schamanek, 684 
P.2d 1257, 1261 (Utah 1984) (holding that the non-complying party refused to respond to 
requests for admission, produce documents, and answer deposition questions, and 
continued to refuse to do these things even after the court entered an order compelling 
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discovery). Clearly, the Utah case law unequivocally illustrates that behavior justifying 
an imposition of sanctions requires a pattern of disregarding court orders during the 
discovery process. Such behavior is seemingly a must for any finding of willfulness or 
bad faith. 
In this case, the district court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining 
that DayNight's behavior was willful or in bad faith. The district court made no finding 
of willfulness or bad faith. After the hearing on Mobilighf s motion for preliminary 
injunction, the district court entered findings that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr "purposely" 
destroyed the laptop. In its final judgment, the court found that Mr. Rowe and Mr. 
LaMarr "intentionally" destroyed the laptop. However, these findings do not indicate 
that Mr. Rowe and Mr. LaMarr's behavior was willful or in bad faith. 
DayNight acknowledges that a district courf s failure to provide a factual finding 
does not necessarily result in reversal of the district court's order. See Kilpatrick, 2008 
UT 82, %19. The court noted that "the district court's failure to make a specific finding of 
willfulness, bad faith, or fault 'is not grounds for reversal if a full understanding of the 
issues on appeal can nevertheless be determined by the appellate court.'" Id. (quoting 
Schettler, 768 P.2d at 962 (holding that the record demonstrated willful disobedience of 
court orders, even though the district court made no finding of willfulness below)). 
Still, the record evidence does not demonstrate the willfulness or bad faith that is 
required to justify the imposition of sanctions. It is true that the district court found that 
DayNight "purposely" and "intentionally" destroyed Mr. Rowers laptop; however, the 
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evidence does not support that any intentional fault attributed to DayNight was 
accompanied by the necessary additional willful behavior. 
In arguing that DayNight acted willfully, Mobilight selected one or two quotes 
from the video recording of the destruction of the laptop, but ignored the majority of Mr. 
LaMarr's statements in the same recording indicating that Mr. LaMarr and Mr. Rowe had 
no bad faith intention. Throughout the video, Mr. LaMarr makes it clear that they are 
destroying the laptop to stop Mobilight from harassing DayNight and to show Mobilight 
that DayNight is not using the laptop. Mr. LaMarr specifically states the following: 
• "We have not used [Mr. Rowe's] laptop. We h^ve not in any way used the 
information that he gleaned from Mobilight. Wp think it best to destroy it." 
• "I do testify that we have not in any way copied any of the data that comes 
from Mobilight's register of potential or alleged intellectual property. We 
have no desire in any way, shape, or form to copy their product or service 
to mimic in any way their business practices and therefore this is why we 
want to do this. To end this problem once and for all." 
Mr. LaMarr and Mr. Rowe also both testified at the preliminary injunction hearing 
regarding why they destroyed the laptop. Their explanation Was reasonable given 
Mobilight's harassment and overbroad request for the entire hard drive of the laptop, 
which contained virtually all of DayNight's work product as well. Moreover, Mr. Rowe 
and Mr. LaMarr* s explanations are reasonable considering their lack of sophistication and 
experience in corporate litigation matters. DayNight displayed no malicious intent to 
destroy evidence in either the video recording or during live testimony. Similar to the 
Kilpatrick case, where the plaintiffs behavior was reasonably given the circumstances, 
see 2008 UT 82, ^ ]38, DayNight's explanation for its behavior is also reasonable given the 
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circumstances surrounding the destruction of the laptop. Thus, there is an insuffient 
evidentiary basis of willfulness or bad faith to support the imposition of sanctions on 
DayNight. 
Furthermore, there is no record evidence indicating that DayNight intentionally 
disobeyed court orders. In fact, in this case there were no repeated court instructions to 
DayNight to provide the laptop's hard drive to Mobilight. DayNight filed its lawsuit 
against Mobilight on July 25, 2008, alleging trespass and other related claims. The video 
recording of the destruction of the laptop was made on July 30, 2008. Although the 
laptop was destroyed after the litigation had begun, discovery in this case had not yet 
begun at the time the laptop was destroyed. There had been no court orders or discovery 
requests for the laptop pursuant to the litigation when the laptop was destroyed. In fact, 
and more importantly, at the time the laptop was destroyed, Mobilight had not yet filed 
its responsive pleadings alleging its trade secrets claims. Mobilight didn't file its answer 
and counterclaim in this case until August 22, 2008—over three weeks after the laptop 
had already been destroyed. DayNight's behavior in destroying the laptop was not 
willful or in bad faith and it cannot be attributed to DayNight's intentional fault because 
DayNight did not demonstrate "a consistent pattern of behavior disregarding discovery 
requirements or court orders." Id. ^[35. 
B. The district court abused its discretion in awarding sanctions 
because it made an erroneous conclusion of law regarding the 
material facts necessary in proving trade secret claims. 
Second, after looking at whether the district court made an adequate finding of fact 
to merit sanctions, this court then determines whether the district court abused its 
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discretion in ordering sanctions to DayNight. See id., TJ23. "An abuse of discretion may 
be demonstrated by showing that the district court relied on can erroneous conclusion of 
law' or that there was 'no evidentiary basis for the trial court's ruling.5" Id (quoting 
Morton, 938 P.2d at 274. 
As discussed above, the district court's imposition of sanctions on DayNight was 
an abuse of discretion because the district court lacked a sufficient evidentiary basis for 
its ruling. However, even if this court were to find that the record evidence supports a 
finding of willfulness, bad faith or fault sufficient to merit sanctions against DayNight, 
the district court still abused its discretion in granting Mobilight's motion for sanctions 
because it made an erroneous conclusion of law. 
Mobilight's case-in-chief centers on a misappropriation of trade secrets claim. 
The district court's final judgment on Mobilight's motion for sanctions concludes that 
"the destroyed computer was evidence central to proving [Mobilight's] claims, and which 
destruction severly prejudiced [Mobilight's] ability to prove its case." This ruling is 
erroneous because the laptop evidence is not necessary to proving Mobilight's 
misappropriation of trade secrets claim, and the district court's assessment of the 
materiality of the laptop in a misappropriation of trade secrets action was wrong. 
Mr. Rowe's personal laptop is not essential to proving Mobilight's trade secrets 
claims. Instead, the actual light towers will either prove or disprove Mobilight's case. In 
its memorandum supporting its motion for sanctions, Mobilight provides no discussion, 
or even logical argument, as to why the destruction of the laptop would so prevent them 
from effectively litigating their case and would justify such an "extreme" and "unusually 
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harsh" remedy as default judgment. Mobilight instead assumes that the laptop contained 
information pertinent to the litigation, and then jumps from that assumption to the 
conclusion that the laptop was central to Mobilight's proof. When in fact, other 
evidence, such as a comparison of the Mobilight light tower to the DayNight prototype 
(and the design documents for the prototype), is far more probative than the speculative 
information that might have been contained on the laptop. Likewise, if DayNight ever 
contacted any of Mobilight's customers (and there is no evidence of such contact), 
witnesses would be available to testify of that contact. 
Utah law interpreting the Uniform Utah Trade Secret Act, as well as Utah 
common law, makes it clear that merely establishing possession of allegedly 
"confidential information" is not a sufficient basis to prevail in a trade secret case. 
Rather, the allegedly misappropriated material must be used against the party that 
developed and owned that information. To prove its claim that Daynight misappropriated 
trade secrets, Mobilight must prove tliree elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) 
communication of the trade secret to [defendant] under an express or implied agreement 
limiting disclosure of the secret, and (3) [defendant's] use of the secret injures [the 
plaintiff]." Water & Energy Systems Tech., Inc. v. Keil 1999 UT 16, ^9, 974 P.2d 821 
(Utah 1999). 
A key factor in determining whether DayNight misappropriated Mobilight's trade 
secrets is whether DayNight actually used the trade secret. As the court in Utah Medical 
Products, Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Associates, Inc. states, 
?2 
Simply identifying documents and claiming that they contain trade secret 
information is not enough. Plaintiff must establish that the infoniiation identified 
in the documents is not published or readily ascertainable infoniiation to those in 
the field. Additionally, plaintiff has reiterated in deposition and at oral argument 
that defendant could not help but use trade secret information in doing what they 
were doing. Yet, plaintiff has failed to identify with specificity exactly what trade 
secrets were used. 
79 F. Supp.2d 1290, 1313 (D. Utah 1999) (emphasis added). 
Mobilight makes the same argument in this case, by arguing that DayNight must 
have used Mobilight 's confidential information, instead of actually looking at the 
DayNight light tower to determine if DayNight actually used Mobilight's confidential 
information or identifying any other specific confidential information that was allegedly 
misappropriated and used.3 The court in Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 
P.2d 690 (Utah 1981), stated that comparing the products is perhaps the most probative 
proof that a party's confidential infoniiation was, in fact, actually used. See id. at 697-98 
("[A]n employer to obtain relief must establish that his former employee's product is a 
copy of his own product, that its method of production was secret and that the former 
employee has used or intends to use confidential infoniiation acquired during his 
employment.v (Emphasis added)). 
In Water & Energy Systems Tech. Inc. v. KeiL 1999 UT 16, 974 P.2d 821, a trade 
secret case, the Utah Supreme Court focused on the similarities and differences of the 
two products. The court held that while the plaintiffs formulae were somewhat "similar' 
At the preliminary injunction hearing, DayNight presented multiple witnesses, including 
various suppliers and an engineering expert, who all testified in DayNight's favor that the 
planning, designing, and manufacturing of DayNight" s light tower is completely different 
from Mobilight. All of these witnesses were available to Mobilight. 
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to defendant's formulae, "significant differences" also existed. See id. ^[11. Again 
focusing on the similarities and differences between the products, the court further 
explained that "[similarities which can be explained by industry or regulatory demands 
cannot suffice to meet the requirements that [defendant] copied [plaintiffs] confidential 
formulae, especially in light of the abundant testimony that the formulae were not copied 
and the substantial amount of information in the public domain regarding water treatment 
chemicals." Id 
The laptop computer could not show that DayNight actually used Mobilight5 s 
trade secrets in building DayNight's light tower prototype. Even assuming the laptop 
might have shown that Mobilighf s confidential information was one the hard drive, that 
evidence could not prove that such information was actually used. Conversely, given the 
court's holdings in Muna and Keil, Mobilight could, however, still attempt to prove its 
case by examining DayNight's product, evaluating how DayNight's light tower was built, 
and explaining how any specific trade secrets were used. But Mobilight did not rely on 
that information and did not provide any explanation for why it would need the laptop to 
prove its case. 
DayNight produced significant evidence and testimony to the district court 
explicating how the two light towers are "radically different," and Mobilight produced no 
such experts or evidence stating the opposite. Instead, Mobilight simply continued to 
rely on the destroyed laptop for its evidence to prove that DayNight used Mobilight's 
confidential information. Thus, the district court's erroneous conclusion that the 
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evidence on the laptop was central to proving Mobilight's claims illustrates the district 
court's abuse of discretion in imposing sanctions on DayNightJ 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING THE 
MOST SEVERE SANCTION ON DAYNIGHT BY GRANTING 
MOBILIGHT DEFAULT JUDGMENT. 
It is axiomatic that Utah courts consider the discovery sanction of default or 
dismissal a rare and extreme sanction. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in W.W. & 
W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 
the extreme sanction of default or dismissal must be tempered by the careful 
exercise of judicial discretion to assure that its imposition is merited. . . . The 
sanction of default judgment is justified where there has been a frustration of the 
judicial process, viz, where the failure to respond to discovery impedes trial on the 
merits and makes it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations of the answer 
have any factual merit. 
568 P.2d 734, 738 (Utah 1977); see also, Dairington v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 456 (Utah 
App. 1991) ("[Djefault judgment is an unusually harsh sanction that should be meted out 
with caution."). It is the requirement for due process that forces a district court to 
exercise extreme caution in awarding default judgment: "in the interest of justice and fair 
play, [courts] favor, where possible, a full and complete opportunity for a hearing on the 
merits of every case." Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d at 12. 
The sanction awarded in this case was extreme and harih, especially given the lack 
of willfulness or bad faith in DayNighf s behavior and the faci that the lack of evidence 
from the laptop does not "make it impossible to ascertain whether the allegations . . . 
have any factual merit." As discussed above, Mobilight is still able to present its case to 
a jury without the laptop and instead use other, more appropriate evidence to prove its 
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case. Thus, the district court's award of default judgment to Mobilight does not meet the 
two-part test set forth in W.W. & W.B. Gardner for imposing such a severe sanction. 
Instead of imposing such a harsh sanction, DayNight asserts that there are various 
other sanctions under rule 37 that could be imposed that would still allow the parties to 
present their cases at trial. DayNight concedes that if this Court allows both Mobilight 
and DayNight to present their cases to a jury at trial, Mobilight would receive "a 
favorable inference in place of the missing evidence." Killpatrick, 2008 UT 82, |^39. 
DayNight also recognizes that this "unfavorable inference may, as a practical matter, 
preclude [or at least impair DayNight] from [effectively] pursuing [its defenses]." Id. 
Thus, at a minimum, if this court determines that an imposition of sanctions against 
DayNight was appropriate, the district court's imposition of the most severe sanction 
against Mobilight was an abuse of discretion because other sanctions combined with the 
inferences given in favor of Mobilight at trial would sufficiently punish DayNight. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
AWARDED MOBILIGHT ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF $120,692.07 AND FAILED TO APPORTION THE FEES 
AND COSTS. 
In the event that this Court upholds the district court's imposition of sanctions 
against DayNight and award of default judgment and attorney fees and costs to 
Mobilight, DayNight asserts that the district court erred in determining the amount of 
attorney fees and costs awarded to Mobilight. The district court in this case awarded 
Mobilight attorney fees and costs in the amount of $120, 692.07 based on the Second 
Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell for Attorney's Fees and Costs (the "Peshell Affidavit"). 
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(See R. 842-44). However, in deteraiining this amount, the district court failed to assess 
the reasonableness of the attorney fees requested and failed to ensure that Mobilight's 
attorneys had properly apportioned the attorney fees and costs|it submitted for collection. 
Thus, because Mobilight's attorneys did not apportion their fees and costs, the district 
court erred in not denying Mobilighf s requests for attorney fees and costs. 
Under Utah law, Mobilight, and ultimately the district court, are required "to 
allocate the prevailing party's attorney fees amount those claims for which it is entitled to 
an award of attorney fees and those for which it is not." Ellsworth Paulson Constr. Co. v. 
51-SPR.LLC 2006 UT App 353, 144 P.3d 261. For this reaspn, the Utah Supreme 
Court has instructed that a party seeking to recover attorney fees "'must categorize the 
time and fees expended for: 
(1) successful claims for which there may be an entitlement to attorney fees, 
(2) unsuccessful claims for which there would hav^ been an entitlement to 
attorney fees had the claims been successful, an|d 
(3) claims for which there is not entitlement of attorney fees.'" 
Foote v. Clarke. 962 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 1998) (quoting Cottor^wood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 
P.2d 266, 269-70 (Utah 1992)). "If a party fails to properly apportion attorney fees, a 
trial court may deny that party's fee requests Utah Farm Prod. Credit Ass*n v. Cox, 627 
P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981). 
In the Peshell Affidavit, Mobilight's attorneys fail to apportion the fees and costs 
incurred in litigating Mobilight's First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, and 
Thirteenth Claims for Relief. Mobilight did not make any distinction between (i) the 
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claims for which the Court awarded default judgment and allowed attorney fees, all of 
which relate to Mobilighf s trade secret related claims and (ii) the claims remaining to be 
tried in this case, which include DayNight's Trespass claim (see R. 4-5); Mobilight's 
remaining counterclaims for Intentional Interference with Economic Relations, Common 
Law Trademark Infringement, Trademark Dilution, Unpaid invoices, and Unjust 
Enrichment (see R. 362-65, 367-69); and KK Machinery's Third Party Complaint 
alleging Breach of Contract against Mobilight and Fraud against Ross Johnson (see R. 
546-47). 
In working on the causes of action for which Mobilight was awarded attorney fees 
and costs, Mobilight's attorneys necessarily spent time researching the facts and law 
related to these unresolved and untried causes of action. No justification exists for 
awarding Mobilight its fees and costs on these undecided claims. Yet, the Peshell 
Affidavit, in many places, makes no distinction between the efforts undertaken on 
Mobilight's trade secret claims and the claims that a jury will have to resolve in the 
future. Instead, the final order providing Mobilight's attorney fees essentially allows 
Mobilight to recover all of its attorney fees, regardless of the claims to which those fees 
and costs are related. 
In fact, many of the time entries submitted by Mr. Peshell are for efforts clearly 
unrelated to the claims for which the Court granted default judgment. Mobilight's 
attorneys submitted time entries that failed to specify whether the attorney was working 
on claims for which the judgment had been granted or for claims that will be resolved in 
the future. For example, on a time entry dated August 8, 2008, one of Mobilight's 
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attorneys stated that he spent 1.4 hours c,,[r]eview[ing] draft Counterclaim and Crossclaim 
on DayNight matter." (R. 791). On another time entry dated August 18, 2008, he spent 
2.0 hours "[r]eview[ing] pleadings for counterclaim and crosscjlaim . . . on KK matter/' 
(R. 791). Mobilight's Counterclaims have five claims still pending—claims for which 
attorney fees were not awarded. There was no apportionment bf the time spent on the 
various claims in Mobilight's counterclaims. Still, Mobilight was awarded its fees for all 
of that time spent. 
The Peshell Affidavit also submits time entries for all of Mobilight's attorneys that 
do not relate in any way to Mobilight's efforts to obtain a temporary restraining order, a 
preliminary injunction, and/or, finally, default judgment. On November 14, 2008, the 
court granted Mobilight's Preliminiary Injunction Order. Nevertheless, the affidavit of 
Mobilight's attorney contains multiple time entries dated after November 14, 2008 for 
activities related to DayNight and Mobilight claims for which attorney fees and costs 
have not been granted. (R. 795-96, 808-812). In fact, Mobilight submitted a $7,000.00 
invoice from a private investigator for work that, at least in pah, was conducted well after 
the district court granted the preliminary injunction. (R. 824). Additionally, the Peshell 
Affidavit asserted extraordinarily high costs for other services. For instance, Mobilight 
requested costs for legal research of $400.00 to $600.00 per njonth when a Lexis small 
firm package of unlimited legal research cost approximately $450.00. (R. 790). 
Mobilight recovered all of the attorney fees and costs it submitted in the Peshell 
Affidavit, despite the unreasonableness of those fees and costs. Given the inconsistencies 
and the anomalies in the Peshell Affidavit regarding attorney fees and costs, as well as 
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Mobilight's failure to apportion those fees and costs, this court should reverse the district 
court's award of attorney fees and costs. 
At the very least, the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing 
regarding the proper amount of damages, attorney fees and costs. Rule 55(b)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[i]f in order to enter judgment or to carry it 
into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to 
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other 
matter, the court may conduct such hearings . . . as it deems necessary and proper." The 
district court awarded Mobilight attorney fees and costs close to one hundred and twenty-
five thousand dollars, and part of those fees and costs were based on time and resources 
expended on claims other than the claims for which the district court granted default 
judgment. DayNight was never allowed the opportunity to examine the requested fees 
and costs submitted in the Peshell Affidavit at an evidentiary hearing on those fees. 
Thus, at the very least, DayNight requests this court reverse the district court's award of 
attorney fees, or in the alternative, for an evidentiary hearing on the attorney fees and 
costs awarded to Mobilight. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning DayNight, in 
imposing the harshest of sanctions—default judgment, and in awarding attorney fees and 
costs without apportioning those fees and costs. First, the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing sanctions because there is an insufficient evidentiary basis that 
DayNight acted willfully or in bad faith. Moreover, the district court abused its 
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discretion in imposing sanctions because it made an erroneous conclusion of law 
concerning the material facts needed to prove Mobilight's trade secret claims. Second, 
even if this court were to uphold the district court's imposition of sanctions, the district 
court abused its discretion in imposing the most severe and harsh sanction available since 
there was no willfulness or bad faith in DayNight's behavior. And third, DayNight 
argues that the court erred in awarding attorneys fees and cost$ when those fees and costs 
were not apportioned properly. Accordingly, DayNight asks this Court to reverse the 
district court's decision to impose sanctions on DayNight and to reverse the district 
court's order for default judgment. Oral argument is requested 
DATED this 16th day of July 2010. 
VANTUS LAW GROUP, P.C. 
V_ Richard F. ErM>r 
Kari A. Tuft 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 16th day of July 2010, two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT DAYNIGHT, LLC were mailed, by 
first class mail, postage pre-paid, to the person(s) named bel(]>w. 
Rinehart L. Peshell, Esq. 
Matheson & Peshell, LLC 
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
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: INJUNCTION ORDER 
Plaintiff & Counterclaim 
Defendant, : CASE NO. 080913997 
vs. 
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant & Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KKK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign : 
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an 
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" : 
LA MARR, an individual, 
Third Party Defendant. 
The Preliminary Injunction hearing in the above-entitled matter was 
conducted on October 7, 8 and 30, 2008. Defendant and counterclaim 
plaintiff, Mobi-Light, Inc. ("Mobilight") was present and represented by 
its counsel, Rmehart L. Peshell and Jonathan D. Parry. Plaintiff, 
DayNight, LLC and third party defendants Cory Rowe ("Mr. Rowe"), Paul 
"Cactus Jack" LaMarr ("Cactus Jack"), and KK Machinery Pty, Ltd. (UKK 
Machinery") were present and represented by their counsel, Richard F. 
Ensor. During the hearing, the Court received live testimony, 
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declarations (the respective requests to use declarations are granted), 
other evidence, as well as the argument from counsel upon which the Court 
now issues the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Preliminary Injunction Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 The business of Mobilight is the design, manufacture, and sale 
of portable light towers and other equipment. 
2 Mobilight holds various confidential proprietary information, 
including trade secrets, regarding the design, manufacture, and sale of 
its products, including business and customer information. 
3 Mobilight has taken reasonable efforts to maintain the 
confidentiality of its confidential information, including but not 
limited to the application of confidentiality agreements with employees 
and suppliers, use of password-protected computer data files, and the 
limit of its employees' access to confidential information on a "need to 
know" basis. 
4 Mobilight's geographic market includes Australia, North 
America, and South America. 
5 Third-Party Defendant William Cory Rowe ("Mr. Rowe") as the 
former Operations Manager of Mobilight, had access to and learned 
Mobilight's confidential information (i.e., its trade secrets) during his 
employment with Mobilight, and signed a non-disclosure agreement dated 
July 15, 2005 promising never to make any unauthorized use or disclosure 
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of Mobilight's confidential information nor to make or manufacture any 
work derivative from or in any way similar to Mobilight's creative works, 
including after termination of his employment. 
6 Mr. Rowe voluntarily ended his employment with Mobilight on 
April 18, 2008. In January 2008, in a conversation with Margret Johnson, 
Vice-President of Human Resources for Mobilight, Mr. Rowe stunned Ms. 
Johnson by stating that he was unhappy with his employment and suggested 
that he and Ms. Johnson could open their own Mobilight business. In 
March of 2008, while Mr. Rowe was still employed by Mobilight, Mr. Rowe 
had email communications with Cactus Jack and assisted Cactus Jack and 
DayNight in locating commercial space for DayNight's new competing 
business and in locating component parts for DayNight's portable light 
tower business. Mr. Rowe admitted during testimony that some of the 
documents he created while still working at Mobilight were for the new 
product line at DayNight, that he kept his work for DayNight a secret, 
because he believed he did not have a future with Mobilight. 
7 Mr. Rowe gave evasive, ambiguous responses to Mobilight as to 
why he was leaving employment with Mobilight. While employed with 
Mobilight, Mr. Rowe had access to and was authorized to use certain 
confidential information data and files contained in Mobilight's computer 
system and contained in CD-ROM computer discs and other forms of 
electronic data storage. 
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8 While employed with Mobilight, Mr. Rowe used a Sony portable 
laptop computer in the performance of his job duties and downloaded 
certain confidential information data and files from Mobilight's computer 
system onto that laptop computer hard drive, including but not limited 
to data and files regarding Mobilight1s product designs, manufacturing 
process, customers, sales methods, business operations, specifications, 
financials, supply costs and pricing. 
9 Third-party defendant Paul "Cactus Jack" LaMarr is general 
manager of third-party defendant KK Machinery Pty Ltd. 
10 Cactus Jack is also a member and general manager of DayNight, 
LLC. 
11 KK Machinery and Mobilight entered into a Distribution 
Agreement on August 14, 2007 in which KK Machinery was granted a 
distributorship for Mobilight products in Western Australia. 
12 Cactus Jack, personally and on behalf of KK Machinery, signed 
a non-disclosure agreement dated June 20, 2007 with Mobilight promising 
never to make any unauthorized use or disclosure of Mobilight's 
confidential information, nor to make or manufacture any works derivative 
from or in any way similar to Mobilight's creative works. 
13 In paragraph 5(e) of the Distributor Agreement, KK Machinery 
promised that as the Distributor, it would not disclose, at any time, any 
confidential business information which Distributor obtained from 
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Mobilight, which such information was not specifically intended for 
public use or distribution by Distributor. 
14 During the course of the Distributorship Agreement, KK 
Machinery and Cactus Jack had access to and learned Mobilight's 
confidential information (i.e., its trade secrets). Mr. Ross Johnson, 
President of Mobilight, gave Cactus Jack special training for a total of 
approximately four or five days regarding Mobilight's light tower 
business. Cactus Jack also photographed and was explained Mobilight's 
process of manufacturing its light towers. 
15 The business name "DayNight" was registered in the Utah 
Department of Commerce on March 19, 2008. 
16 DayNight, LLC was registered in the Utah Department of 
Commerce on June 12, 2008. 
17 KK Machinery is in a joint venture with plaintiff and 
counterclaim defendant DayNight, LLC for the design, manufacture, and 
sale of portable light towers. 
18 KK Machinery and DayNight are direct competitors to Mobilight 
in the portable light tower market. 
19 KK Machinery, DayNight and Cactus Jack are brand new to the 
portable light tower industry, and had no experience in the industry 
before KK Machinery entered into its distribution agreement with 
Mobilight. 
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20 After Mr. Rowe left his employment with Mobilight, he began 
work officially for KK Machinery and/or DayNight in a position identical 
to or nearly identical to his former Operations Manager position with 
Mobilight. 
21 On June 2, 2008 Mr. Rowe was requested to return the hard 
drive from his laptop computer that contains Mobilight's confidential 
proprietary information, including information regarding Mobilight's 
customers, vendors, costs, pricing, and technical information regarding 
Mobilight's production methods. Mr. Rowe was even offered to be given a 
brand new hard drive in replacement so he could keep the computer itself. 
Mr. Rowe did not give Mobilight the computer or the hard drive. Instead, 
Mr. Rowe replied on June 2, 2008 "would have to check with Karl [Prall] 
and Cactus Jack of KK Machinery." The Court finds that Mr. Rowe's 
refusal to return the hard drive from his laptop computer which contained 
Mobilight's confidential, proprietary trade secret information supports 
the reasonable inference and finding that Mr. Rowe intended to wrongfully 
use and/or did wrongfully use Mobilight's protected information. 
22 On July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack intentionally 
destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive that Mr. Rowe had 
used while employed with Mobilight and as further described above in 
Paragraph 21 above. The intentional destruction of the laptop computer 
permanently deprives Mobilight and the Court of the evidence contained 
on the laptop computer. 
DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT PAGE 7 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
23 Rowe was further requested on June 2, 2008 to return to 
Mobilight's control the cell phone number (801) 755-9395 that Mobilight 
had paid for and that Mr. Rowe used during his employment at Mobilight. 
Mr. Rowe said that he "would have to check with Karl and Cactus Jack of 
KK Machinery." Mr. Rowe further admitted in a June 2, 2 008 telephone 
conversation that KK Machinery was already paying tis cell phone bill for 
number (801) 755-9395. 
24 Mr. Rowe refused to return control of the (801) 755-9395 cell 
phone number to Mobilight until he was ordered by the Court to do so on 
September 5, 2008. 
25 Prior to the return to Mobilight of the SIM card for the cell 
phone assigned to the (801) 755-9395 cell phone number, the data from the 
SIM card was erased. This intentional act permanently deprives Mobilight 
and the Court of the evidence contained on said SIM card. 
26 Mobilight maintains the identities of its suppliers as 
confidential information. Using Mobilight's confidential supplier list, 
Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, and DayNight have contacted key Mobilight 
suppliers about gaining a supply of specific components for the DayNight 
light towers. The Court finds that although the suppliers maintain 
public businesses and are accessible through various public media, Mr. 
Rowe, Cactus Jack and DayNight' s source of the suppliers is from 
Mobilight's confidential information. 
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27 (1) Due to their intimate knowledge and possession of various 
of Mobilight's confidential proprietary information, including its trade 
secrets; (2) due to the fact that the KK Machmery/DayNight joint venture 
directly competes with Mobilight m the portable light tower industry; 
(3) due to the fact that Cactus Jack has already contacted two of 
Mobilight1s largest customers m Australia, DESS and Fortescue; (4) due 
to the fact that Mr. Rowe has already contacted some of Mobilight's 
suppliers, including, but not limited to MetalFab, Henderson Wheel, and 
Anxter International; (5) due to the fact that Mr. Rowe refused to return 
Mobilight's confidential information contained on his laptop computer 
hard drive to Mobilight, and thereafter knowingly and intentionally 
destroyed said laptop computer; and (6) due to the fact that Mr. Rowe 
refused to return control of the (801) 755-9395 telephone number to 
Mobilight, and then erased the data from the SIM card before returning 
the same to Mobilight; the Court finds that Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack will 
use and/or have used, and disclose and/or have disclosed Mobillght's 
confidential proprietary information, including its trade secrets, m 
their work for the KK Machmery/DayNight joint venture The Court finds 
that, (l) the laptop computer DayNight's employee, Mr Rowe, used while 
Mr. Rowe was employed with Mobilight was purposely dropped off the roof 
of DayNight's building and was then thrown away The destruction of the 
laptop computer was videotaped That during the videotape, Cactus Jack 
acknowledged "destroying any harmful evidence " That destruction of 
DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT PAGE 9 BINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
evidence supports a reasonable inference of the threatened use and/or use 
of Mobilight's confidential information under the Utah Uniform Trade 
Secret Act, U.C.A. § 13-24-1, et seq. and under the agreements of the 
parties; (ii) DayNight has used at least three Vendors that Mobilight 
also uses; (iii) Cactus Jack acknowledged that he has confidential 
information and other property acquired from Mobilight, which he refused 
to return to Mobilight until so ordered by the Court; (iv) Cactus Jack 
has contacted two of Mobilight's largest customqrs in Australia, i.e. 
DESS and Fortescue and offered to sell them DayNight portable light 
towers; and, (v) DayNight has assembled a portable light tower that is 
similar to and is derived from Mobilight's portable light towers design 
and confidential information in several ways, including, but not limited 
to, the following: (1) incorporation of a "diamond" plated front panel 
and laser-cut rear panel; (2) use of a hydraulically-operated light mast; 
(3) use of the exact same make and model gasoline motor as Mobilight uses 
in its portable light towers; (4) use of a bank of parabolic reflector 
lights very similar in design to that of Mobilight's design; (5) use of 
push-pull cables similar to those used in Mobilight's towers; and (6) use 
of an axle assembly and electrical cables similar to those used in 
Mobilight's towers. 
28 The Court further finds there are some differences in the 
design and specifications of the Mobililght light towers and the DayNight 
prototype light tower. Those differences include the hydraulic ram 
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designs, lighting mast designs, chassis structure, light system designs, 
stabilizer legs and others. Despite these differences and the 
availability of some light tower design and specifications information 
available in the public domain, Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack and DayNight's 
prototype is a derivative of and sufficiently similar to Mobilight's 
light tower which further establishes that Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack and 
DayNight have used Mobilight's confidential proprietary information and 
trade secrets for their own benefit. 
29 Mobilight, through communication from its counsel, reasonably 
attempted to obtain confirmation from KK Machinery, Mr. Rowe, and Cactus 
Jack that they would work to maintain the confidentiality of Mobilight's 
confidential proprietary information and trade secrets, and would not use 
such information in competition with Mobilight; but KK Machinery, Mr. 
Rowe, and Cactus Jack failed to offer any such confirmation, serving as 
further evidence of their threat of misappropriation of Mobilight's 
confidential proprietary information and trade secrets. In fact, KK 
Machinery refused to communicate further about the matter, other than 
through litigation. 
30 The DayNight defendants collectively in their confidentiality 
agreements with Mobilight acknowledge that Mobilight has confidential, 
proprietary, trade secret information. 
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31 Mobilight holds trade secrets as defined in the Utah Uniform 
Trade Secret Act, § 13-24-1, et seq., and paragraph 2a of the Property 
Protection Agreements. 
32 Consistent with the definition of the meaning of "status quo" 
with respect to applications for injunctive relief as provided in Schrier 
v. Univ. of Colorado, 427 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir. 2005), the Court is 
satisfied that this preliminary injunction will maintain the status quo, 
as defined in the Schrier decision. The Court further finds that 
Mobilight's request for a preliminary injunction is not subject to any 
"heightened burden" scrutiny. 
33 If Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, KK Machinery ^nd/or DayNight are not 
restrained from misappropriating Mobilight's Confidential Information in 
the KK Machinery/DayNight joint venture in the design, manufacture, and 
sale of portable light towers, Mobilight will suffer irreparable harm 
because it could be injured by losing up to 100% of its sales to its 
customers in Australia, especially considering KK Machinery's physical 
presence in Australia and KK Machinery's detailed knowledge of Mobilight 
customers it gained through the Distributor Agreement. 
34 Irreparable harm to Mobilight is heightened by (1) the fact 
that Mobilight is essentially a single product line business, has a 
significant fixed cost base for its facilities an$ employee expenses and 
a decrease in revenue due to unfair or illegal competition will impair 
Mobilight's ability to meet its fixed obligations and, consequently, 
DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT PAGE 12 FINDINGS & CONCLUSIONS 
threaten its financial viability; (2) by the fact that Mobilight has 
expended significant funds to develop markets for its products with the 
anticipation it will recoup those funds through future sales, and unfair 
or illegal interference with those relationships will cause Mobilight to 
lose the value of its marketing investment; (3) by the fact that 
DayNight, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery have contacted two of Mobilight's 
largest customers m Australia, DESS and Fortescue, and allowing said 
parties to continue to sell to such customers, could cause Mobilight to 
lose 18%-20% of its overall sales; and (4) if Mobilight's future sales 
are unfairly or illegally interfered with, Mobilight will lose the value 
of Mobilight's significant historical research and development 
investment, which Mobilight anticipated it would recoup through future 
sales. 
3 5 A preliminary injunction order versus Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, 
KK Machinery, and DayNight enjoining them from using or disclosing 
Mobilight's Confidential Information is necessary to prevent the 
unauthorized disclosure and use of Mobilight's Confidential Information, 
as the unauthorized disclosure and use of Mobilight's Confidential 
Information will cause injury, as above set forth, that would be 
irreparable, because it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to 
quantify such injury and/or damages Unauthorized use and disclosure of 
such information will cause Mobilight to lose product sales and market 
share for the reasons stated above This preliminary injunction targets 
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the unauthorized use of confidential, proprietary, trade secret 
information described herein and not the general knowledge, experience, 
memory and skill of Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, DayNight and KK Machinery. 
36 The Court has considered all of the criteria under U.R.C.P. 
65A, and finds that Mobilight has established irreparable injury 
warranting relief under Rule 65A. 
37 The Court has considered the balance of harms factor under 
U.R.C.P. 65A, and finds that this factor weighs in] favor of Mobilight in 
recognition that Mobilight has expended millions o£ dollars in developing 
its business and the value of the confidential information. The Court 
finds that if the preliminary injunction requested is not issued, the 
value of loss of Mobilight's confidential information and the competitive 
edge that confidential information gives Mobilight in the marketplace 
would be extremely difficult to measure. In comparison, the Court finds 
that the potential harm to the DayNight defendants collectively, and the 
harm to Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, DayNight, and KK Machinery individually 
is outweighed by the potential harm to Mobilight if the preliminary 
injunction is not issued. KK Machinery has other business activities that 
will not be impacted if the requested temporary restraining order is 
issued. 
38 The Court has considered the public interest impact criteria 
under U.R.C.P. 65A, and finds that there is a strong public policy and 
public interest in protecting trade secret information and enforcing 
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confidentiality agreements, and that the requested preliminary 
injunction, if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest. 
39 The Court recognizes that the requested preliminary injunction 
may have a negative impact on competition which can at times be adverse 
to the public interest, but with respect to the circumstances, restraint 
is necessary because the DayNight defendants are competing based upon the 
use of confidential information and trade secrets belonging to Mobilight. 
This unauthorized use of Mobilight's confidential, proprietary, trade 
secret information is distinguishable from a classic non-competition 
agreement where one is prohibited from engaging in employment with a 
competitor, therefore, the usual time and area restrictions on 
restrictive employment covenants have no application. 
40 The Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that 
Mobilight will prevail on the merits of the underlying claim. 
41 The agreements between Mobilight and DayNight defendants 
provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes as 
a matter of law: 
1 DayNight defendants have, individually and/or collectively 
breached their common law duty of loyalty, the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets 
Act, and the specific applicable provisions of their respective 
agreements with Mobilight. 
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2 That Mobilight will suffer immediate and irreparable injury, 
loss, or damage, including the publication and unauthorized use of 
Mobilight's trade secrets, and loss of sales and market share for 
Mobilight due to the wrongful disclosure anc| use of Mobilight's 
confidential proprietary information and intellectual property, unless 
the preliminary injunction requested by Mobilight is issued. 
3 That the Court has considered the balance of harms analysis 
under Rule 65A, recognizes that Mobilight has expended millions of 
dollars in developing its confidential information, finds that the value 
of loss of Mobilight's confidential information a:qd the competitive edge 
that confidential information gives Mobilight in the marketplace would 
be extremely difficult to measure, and finds that the actual and 
threatened injury to Mobilight outweighs whatever damage the preliminary 
injunction may cause the parties who are restrained or enjoined. 
4 The preliminary injunction will not be adverse to the public 
interest. 
5 There is a substantial likelihood that Mobilight will prevail 
on the merits of its underlying claims, or the case presents serious 
issues on the merits which should be the subject of further litigation. 
6 Mobilight has not previously applied to any judicial officer 
for similar relief. 
7 That Mobilight is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and 
costs incurred in obtaining the Temporary Restraining Order dated 
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September 16, 2008, as well as this Preliminary Injunction, as provided 
for in the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act and the respective written 
agreements between DayNight defendants and Mobilight, in an amount to be 
shown hereafter by affidavit pending final resolution and decision on the 
merits of all claims, unless otherwise ordered by the Court. 
ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED that, effective as of November 14, 2008, and pursuant 
to U.C.R.P. 65A, plaintiff and counterclaim defendant DayNight, LLC, and 
third-party defendants William Cory Rowe, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery, 
and their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and those 
persons in active concert or participation with them, are hereby 
restrained and enjoined as follows until a trial on the merits of 
Mobilight's underlying claims in this matter. 
A. DayNight, Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery shall 
not use or disclose any of Mobilight's confidential proprietary 
information (including but not limited to Mobilight's technical design 
information, supplier information, customer information, manufacturing 
information, and business information); 
B. Mr. Rowe shall not work in any capacity for the KK 
Machinery/DayNight light tower joint venture; 
C. Cactus Jack shall not work for the KK Machinery/DayNight 
light tower joint venture; 
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D. Mr. Rowe, Cactus Jack, KK Machinery, and DayNight shall 
immediately, if they have not already returned to Mobilight, all of 
Mobilight's Confidential Information m their possession, including but 
not limited to, return of Mobilight's files and data from Mr. Rowe' s 
laptop computer hard drive, or any other electronic or printed medium, 
and including all photographs KK Machinery and/or Cactus Jack and/or Mr. 
Rowe took while visiting or working on Mobilight's premises; and all 
copies and reproductions of the same, electronic or otherwise. 
E. DayNight, KK Machinery, Cactus Jadk and W. Cory Rowe are 
prohibited from making any light tower product derived from the 
confidential information and creative works of Mobilight. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Mobilight is entitled to reasonable 
attorney's fees and costs incurred m obtaining the Temporary Restraining 
Order dated September 16, 2008, as well as this Preliminary Injunction, 
as provided for m the Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act and the respective 
written agreements between DayNight defendants and Mobilight, in an 
amount to be shown hereafter by affidavit pending final resolution and 
decision on the merits of all claims, unless otherwise ordered by the 
Court. 
THIS ORDER is issued on day of November, 20 0 8 at the time of 
THIS ORDER shall be immediately served upon DayNight, Mr. Rowe, 
Cactus Jack, and KK Machinery 
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THIS ORDER shall be filed forthwith in the clerk's office and 
entered of record. 
THIS ORDER shall remain in effect until the Court renders its 
decision on the merits after a jury trial on this matter,. 
Dated this j j day of November/ 2008 
i 
TYR01TO E . MEDLEY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of L|aw, and Preliminary 
Injunction Order, to the following, this N^A day of November, 2008: 
Richard F. Ensor 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1639 
Rinehart L. Peshell 
Richard M. Matheson 
Jonathon D. Parry 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5383 South 900 East, Suite 205 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAYNIGHT, LLC, a Utah limited 
liability company, 
Plaintiff & Counterclaim 
Defendant, 
vs, 
MOBI-LIGHT, INC., a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant & Counterclaim 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
KKK MACHINERY PTY, LTD., a foreign 
corporation, W. CORY ROWE, an 
individual, and PAUL "CACTUS JACK" 
LA MARR, an individual, 
Third Party Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 080913997 
This matter came before the Court for hearing on January 5, 2009, 
in connection with the defendant and counter-claim plaintiff's ("Mobi-
Light") Motion for Sanctions. At the conclusion of the hearing, the 
Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the parties' 
written submissions, the relevant legal authority and counsel's oral 
argument. Being now fully informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In its Motion for Sanctions, Mobi-Light seeks the entry of Default 
Judgment against the plaintiff ("DayNight") and the third-party 
defendants with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims for Relief of its First Amended 
Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. These claims pertain to the 
alleged misappropriation by DayNight and the third-party defendants of 
Mobi-Light's confidential information, including information that was 
allegedly downloaded onto a laptop computer by Mobi-Light7s former 
employee, third-party defendant W. Cory Rowe ("Mr. Rowe") . 
Mobi-Light asserts that direct evidence of the alleged 
misappropriation would have been contained on the laptop computer, which 
was destroyed by Mr. Rowe and third-party defendant Paul "Cactus Jack" 
LaMarr ("Cactus Jack") on July 30, 2008. Mobi-Light argues that the 
appropriate sanction for the destruction of this evidence is the entry 
of Default Judgment. While recognizing that Default Judgment is a severe 
sanction, Mobi-Light argues that lesser sanctions will not remedy the 
damage caused by the destruction of the computer. 
Before considering the parties' respective legal arguments, it is 
worth noting that this matter was previously before this Court in 
connection with a Preliminary Injunction hearing conducted on October 7, 
8 and 30, 2008. Subsequently, the Court issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Preliminary Injunction Order, dated November 14, 
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2008. Certain of the Findings made by the Court in connection with the 
Preliminary Injunction hearing are also relevant to the present Motion 
for Sanctions. 
To summarize, the Court found that Mr. Rowe had access to and 
learned Mobi-Light's confidential information, including information 
contained in the form of electronic data. The Court also found that 
while still employed for Mobi-Light, Mr. Rowe assisted Cactus Jack on 
various endeavors associated with DayNight. After leaving his 
employment, Mr. Rowe was asked to return the hard drive from his laptop 
computer. 
The Court found that Mr. Rowe's "refusal to return the hard drive 
from his laptop computer which contained Mobi-Light's confidential, 
proprietary trade secret information supports the reasonable inference 
and finding that Mr. Rowe intended to wrongfully use Mobi-Light's 
protected information." (Findings and Conclusions at para. 21). The 
Court went on to find that Mo]n July 30, 2008, Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack 
intentionally destroyed Mr. Rowe's laptop computer and hard drive . . . 
The intentional destruction of the laptop computer permanently deprives 
Mobi-Light and the Court of the evidence contained on the laptop 
computer." (Findings and Conclusions at para. 22). 
In light of the foregoing, the Court evaluates the parties' legal 
positions with respect to the issue of whether Mr. Rowe's and Cactus 
Jack's intentional destruction of the laptop computer warrants the entry 
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of Default Judgment against DayNight and the third-party defendants. 
Mobi-Light asserts that the Court's authority to impose sanctions for the 
destruction of discoverable evidence derives from Rule 37(g) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 37(g) states: 
(g) Failure to preserve evidence. Nothing in this rule limits 
the inherent power of the court to take any action authorized 
by Subdivision (b)(2) if a party destroys, conceals, alters, 
tampers with or fails to preserve a document, tangible item, 
electronic data or other evidence in violation of a duty. 
Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose 
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide 
electronically stored information lost as a result of the 
routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system. 
A secondary source of authority for the imposition of sanctions for the 
destruction of evidence is the evidentiary doctrine of spoliation. The 
general rule of this doctrine is that the bad faith destruction of 
evidence relevant to the proof of an issue gives rise to an adverse 
inference that the party who destroyed the evidence did so to hide 
relevant information. See Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 56 F.2d 524, 551 
(7th Cir. 1985); Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 
(3d Cir. 1994) (The imposition of sanctions for the alleged spoliation 
of evidence involves a balancing of several considerations: the degree 
of fault of the party responsible for the loss of the evidence, the 
degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party, and the necessity of 
deterring similar conduct by other parties in the future) . 
In deciding whether a spoliation inference should be applied, courts 
look to the following factors: (1) The evidence is in the adverse party's 
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control; (2) the adverse party intentionally destroys the evidence, 
rather than simply disposing of it as part of a routine process; (3) the 
evidence destroyed is relevant; and (4) the adverse party could have 
foreseen that the evidence was discoverable. See Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 
F.R.D. 233, 248 (D.N.J. 2000); See also Aramburu v. The Boeing Co., 112 
F.3d 1398, 1407 ("The adverse inference must be predicated on the bad 
faith of the party destroying the records. Mere negligence in losing or 
destroying the records is not enough because it does not support an 
inference of the consciousness of a weak case."). 
In addition to a spoliation inference, there are other possible 
sanctions available for the destruction of evidence, with dismissal or 
Default Judgment being the most severe. A number of these cases appear 
to fall under the authority granted to courts under various versions of 
Rule 37, with overlapping discussion of general spoliation doctrine 
principles. 
In surveying these cases, the Court notes that in addition to 
finding bad faith, courts also assess whether the violating party's 
misconduct has caused substantial prejudice and that less drastic 
sanctions would not be appropriate. Pressey v. Patterson, 898 F.2d 1018, 
1021 (5th Cir. 1990) . The Seventh Circuit, for instance, has stressed 
that the sanction of default (in the case of a defendant) or dismissal 
(in the case of a plaintiff) is to be applied only in extreme scenarios 
or when lesser sanctions have proven futile. Ellinqsworth v. Chrysler, 
DAYNIGHT V. MOBI-LIGHT PAGE 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1981). However, "xa default judgment is an 
appropriate sanction if the sanctioned party acted with willfulness, bad 
faith or fault' . . . The Seventh Circuit finds 'fault' in the context of 
sanctions if the violative conduct is unreasonable - it does not rely on 
the party's subjective motivation for the violative action. Fault could 
also entail 'gross negligence, ' or Na flagrant disregard7 of the duty to 
"preserve and monitor the condition" of material evidence." Kucala 
Enters, v. Auto Wax Co., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8833, 56 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 
(Callaghan) 487 (N.D. 111. May 23, 2003) (internal citations omitted). 
Having considering the foregoing legal authority, the Court first 
rules that the fact that there was no discovery Order in place when the 
laptop computer was destroyed is irrelevant. The Court interprets Rule 
37(g) as recognizing the duty to preserve evidence and the Court's 
inherent power to sanction the destruction of evidence which a party can 
reasonably anticipate as being discoverable. The Court is satisfied that 
there is no need for the Court to first order preservation in order for 
Rule 37(g) to be applicable. Indeed, there is no such limitation on the 
Court's inherent authority under Rule 37(g) to impose the sanctions 
outline in Rule 37(b)(2) where a party has destroyed discoverable 
evidence. 
Next, the Court rules that the requirements for imposing the 
sanction of Default Judgment are met in this case. First, Mr. Rowe and 
Cactus Jack knew or could reasonably have anticipated that the laptop 
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computer would be used as potential evidence in the litigation with Mobi-
Light. Indeed, Cactus Jack in the video of the July 30, 2008, 
destruction of the laptop, states that he and Mr. Rowe were "about to 
destroy any final, potential harmful evidence that might link us to any 
sort of lawsuit to Mobi-Light regarding their concerns about intellectual 
property." Clearly, these parties had a duty to preserve this evidence 
and yet they chose to willfully and in bad faith destroy the laptop in 
order to permanently deprive Mobi-Light and this Court of the evidence 
contained on the laptop. The videotaping of the destruction of the 
laptop confirms these parties' flagrant disregard of the duty to preserve 
and the potential consequences of their actions. 
Further, the evidence at issue was highly relevant to Mobi-Light's 
allegations and claims and Mr. Rowe and Cactus Jack were well aware of 
this when they destroyed the laptop. Indeed, the relevance and 
foreseeability of discovery of the evidence contained on the laptop was 
readily apparent to these parties. 
Additionally, the Court determines that Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's 
destructive acts will cause substantial prejudice to Mobi-Light. For 
instance, because the evidence contained on the hard drive of the laptop 
has been destroyed, the jury would be left to speculate regarding the 
nature and extent of Mobi-Light's confidential information contained on 
the hard drive and whether this information was actually being accessed, 
transferred and/or used. 
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The final issue before the Court is the severity of the sanction to 
be imposed. As demonstrated by case law discussed above, the severity 
of the sanction imposed correlates with a party's level of culpability. 
In this case, there is direct evidence of Mr. Rowe's and Cactus Jack's 
intentional destruction of relevant evidence for the purpose of hiding 
potential damaging information. Further, there is a significant level 
of prejudice to Mobi-Light because the evidence at issue goes to the 
heart of Mobi-Light's claims and is the central and most direct evidence 
of DayNight's and the third-party defendants' alleged wrongdoing. Next, 
the actual videotaped destruction of the evidence creates an 
extraordinary circumstance which demonstrates Mr. Rowe's and Cactus 
Jack's disregard for the Court and the judicial process. Considering 
these factors in their totality, the Court is persuaded that the level 
of culpability is such that Default Judgment is warranted and that a less 
drastic sanction would not be appropriate under these unique 
circumstances. Accordingly, Mobi-Light's Motion for Sanctions is 
granted. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
l^ / 
Dated this **• / day of March, 2009. 
TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
DISTg/ECT COURT JUDGE 
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This action came regularly before the Court on the 5th day of January, 2009 for hearing 
regarding Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ("Mobilight") Motion for 
Sanctions requesting default judgment against Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and Third-
Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd. (an Australian company), W. Cory Rowe, and Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr. 
Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC, and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, 
Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr have each voluntarily submitted to the 
jurisdiction of this Court by filing their Answer to Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complaint and also by filing pleadings and presenting evidence and argument in this 
matter. 
Third-Party Defendants Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr and W. Cory Rowe voluntarily and 
personally appeared, and Richard F. Ensor, counsel for Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC, 
and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La 
Marr, appeared at the time and place set for the hearing. Counterclaim Plaintiff and Third-Party 
Plaintiff Mobilight, Inc. was represented by Jonathon D. Parry and Rinehart L. Peshell, and appeared 
at the time and place set for hearing. 
The Court, on March 25, 2009, filed its Memorandum Decision granting Mobi-Light, Inc.'s 
Motion for Sanctions and default judgment for Mobi-Light, Inc. against Counterclaim Defendant 
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and 
Thirteenth Claims for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint. As detailed in the Court's Memorandum Decision, the Court granted Mobi-Light, Inc.'s 
Motion for Sanctions and granted Mobi-Light, Inc. default judgment on the grounds that 
Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. 
Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr intentionally destroyed W. Cory Rowe's laptop 
2 
computer, that the destroyed computer was evidence central to proving Mobi-Light, Inc.'s claims, 
and which destruction severely prejudiced Mobi-Light, Inc.'s ability to prove its case. 
On June 18, 2009, Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc. filed its Motion for Entry of Final 
Judgment, supported by affidavit of its counsel. On July 8, 2009, Counterclaim Defendant 
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr filed their Memorandum In Opposition To Mobilight, Inc.'s Motion For Final 
Entry of Default Judgment. On July 27, 2009, Counterclaim Plaintiff Mobi-Light, Inc. filed its 
Reply in Support of Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, supported by counsel's second affidavit. 
On September 21, 2009, the Court held an oral argument hearing regarding Mobi-Light, Inc.'s 
Motion for Entry of Final Judgment, and took the matter under advisement. On November 10, 2009, 
the Court issued its Memorandum Decision granting Mobi-Light, Int.'s Motion for Entry of Final 
Judgment. In that Memorandum Decision, the Court ruled, inter alia, as follows: 
1. That the claims remaining in the case do not overlap factually or legally with the claims 
Mobilight seeks judgment upon, and finding no just reason for delay, granted Mobilight's 
request for Rule 54(b) certification. 
2. That Mobilight is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs, and that the amount of 
such fees and costs requested are reasonable in light of the complexity of the case and the 
scope of the litigation. 
3. That the form of the Final Judgment has the requisite specificity and properly focuses on 
the use or disclosure of trade secrets, and that consistent with the Court's prior decisions, 
there is a "cognizable danger" that the plaintiff may further misappropriate Mobilight's 
trade secrets in the future, particularly since the trade secrets which were misappropriated 
were contained in an electronic format. 
THEREFORE, having reviewed the record in this matter; and, having considered the Second 
Affidavit of Rinehart L. Peshell pertaining to Mobi-Light's attorney's fees and costs incurred in 
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pursuing Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims 
for Relief, and, otherwise being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted final judgment against Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, 
LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack" 
La Marr with respect to the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims 
for Relief of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim and Third-Party Complaint. 
2. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Counterclaim Defendant 
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, to cease and desist from using or 
disclosing to any other person or entity any of Mobi-Light, Inc.'s Confidential Information, 
including its trade secrets. 
3. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Third-Party Defendants 
W. Cory Rowe and Paul "Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, from working for 
the KK Machinery/DayNight light tower joint venture. 
4. Mobi-Light, Inc. is granted a permanent injunction against Counterclaim Defendant 
DayNight, LLC and Third-Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul 
"Cactus Jack" La Marr enjoining them, and each of them, to return to Mobi-Light, Inc. all of its 
Confidential Information in their possession, including, but not limited to, return of Mobi-Light, 
Inc.'s files and data from Mr. Rowe's laptop computer hard drive or any other electronic or printed 
medium, and including all photographs KK Machinery, Cactus Jack, and Mr. Rowe took while 
visiting or working in Mobi-Light, Inc.'s premises, and all copies and reproductions of the same, 
electronic or otherwise. 
5. Mobi-Light, Inc. is awarded and Counterclaim Defendant DayNight, LLC and Third-
Party Defendants KK Machinery Pty, Ltd., W. Cory Rowe, and Paul "Cactus Jack'" La Marr shall 
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pay to iV1 »hi f iszht. in'.* ihr 1* /^! 'ixed-^um Judgment Amount '*f $120,692.07 in court costs and 
attorne} ^ ieeb HULL:: . .. ._.„L.:a. . :. . : 
a. Attorney's fees incurred from May 23, 2008 through May 22, 2009 ^~ ! ! 1 3.75 
b. Costs incurred from May 23, 2008 throw* M.r 22, 20(- S30.37S.32 
>'70.6O2.n7 
6. The Judgment Amount shall bear interest at 2.4% per annum, in accordance with Utah 
incurred hereafter in collecting said Judgment Amount, is paid in full; 
rhe fixed sum Judgment .Amount of $120,692.07 shall be augmented in the amount of 
i. <i ^>:.*J . .*.-.•_. attorney's fees expended in enforcing and collecting said Ji ldgment 1: y 
execution or otherwise, as shall be established hereafter by affidavit; and, 
h i^rsuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Judgment represents the 
express oc.-.niiiui-* \. - . :..-: • ••:'. ;.••: a :.i,a: a^nicM oet\\~_ i:\c L^ ^ve-named 
parties for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Claims for Relief of 
Mobi-I ight, Inc.'s First Amended Counterclaim a d^ \\\\: r-'\, •. ^ '.i\y r,\ '"^;-: •". v.F ;> • 
certification pursuant to Kulc :• r\ r.* is appropriate because me ,;!aim=» remaining between the parties 
in this Case No. 080913997 are separate from and do not overlap wiih -he First. Second, fhin:. 
Fourth. ' :f*:- <\\'h ! .>:it'! - '1 i teenth CI; iii ns for R elief of ,)\ lobi I igl it, Inc 5s First A n lencled 
( vurUer^iaiin ana .;,. VM*JI!> Complaint. 
\\ 
\\ 
w 
w 
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9. This Judgment is not subject to revision, unless and until it is augmented as provided for 
herein. 
JUDGMENT entered this / ^ day of /Lcv-^ 2009. 
BY THE COURT: 
C 
7 * W E / 7 ? 
Hon. Tyrpne Medley, District Judge 
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I hereby certify that I served a copy of the foregoing Final Judgment this/^" day of 
November, 2009, by hand delivery, and via facsimile, to the following: 
Richard F. Esnor 
Vantus Law Group 
3165 East Millrock Drive, Ste. 160 
Salt Lake City, UT 84121 
801-931-2500 r-H^n-i-
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